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Abstract 
 
A variety of Transparency-Enhancing Technologies has been presented during the past years. 
However, investigation of frameworks for classification and assessment of Transparency-
Enhancing Technologies has lacked behind. The lack of precise classification and 
categorization approaches poses an obstacle not only to systematic requirements analysis for 
Transparency-Enhancing Technologies but also to investigation and analysis of their 
capabilities and their suitability to contribute to privacy protection. This paper addresses this 
research gap. In particular, it presents a set of categorization parameters for describing the 
properties and functionality of a Transparency-Enhancing Technology on the one hand, and a 
categorization of Transparency-Enhancing Technologies on the other hand. 
1. Transparency-Enhancing Technologies 
 
The prevailing business model on the Internet relies on targeted advertising, which builds 
upon user profiling (Enders et al., 2008). The extensive data collection and analysis necessary 
for user profiling threaten users' privacy (Hildebrandt, 2009; Schermer, 2011) and have lead 
to an increased demand for privacy protection mechanisms. Classical privacy protection 
mechanisms aim primarily at confidentiality, i.e., data minimization and obfuscation (PISA 
Consortium, 2003). While these Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PET) offer to users 
valuable mechanisms to protect themselves from unwanted data disclosure, they are not very 
well suited in the context of user profiling and personalization in Internet services (Müller et 
al., 2012; Novotny and Spiekermann, 2013; Solove, 2008; Weitzner et al., 2006). On the one 
hand, users do not primarily aim at data-minimization but are willing to disclose data in order 
to benefit from service usage and personalization (Acquisti and Gross, 2006; Fujitsu Res. 
Inst., 2010; Gross and Acquisti, 2005). On the other hand, PET can hardly prevent profilers 
from collecting a user's data from other sources than the user herself and can also hardly 
prevent inferences from already collected data (Accorsi et al., 2012; Calandrino et al., 2011). 
Currently, personal data is collected, analyzed and used by providers of Internet services 
based upon informed consent. However, the relation of users and providers of data-collecting 
services on the Internet is characterized by high information asymmetry (Schermer, 2011), 
i.e., users usually can not determine what data about them is actually collected by providers, 
let alone, which information about them is inferred from collected data and how that data is 
being used.  
Transparency-Enhancing Technologies (TETs) aim at reducing this information asymmetry 
by providing users with information regarding providers’ data collection, analysis and usage. 
Hansen defines TETs as “tools which can provide to the individual concerned clear visibility 
of aspects relevant to [its personal] data and the individual's privacy” (Hansen, 2008, p. 191). 
Hence, TETs do not aim at data-minimization but at providing users with insight into a data 
controller's intended and actual data handling behavior. Thus, TETs have the potential to 
constitute valuable complements to PET. A variety of very different TETs has been presented 
during the last years, e.g., the “DataTrack” (Fischer-Hübner et al., 2011), Google's “My 
Account”1 or the “Mozilla Privacy Icons”2. However, only a few attempts at systematic 
categorization of TETs have been conducted. The resulting lack of a comprehensive 
classification framework for TETs impedes not only systematic requirements analysis for 
TETs but also analysis of their capabilities and their suitability to contribute to privacy 
protection. A common language to precisely describe a TET's properties, requirements and 
functionality is needed for the promotion of TET research and development. This paper 
addresses this research gap. In particular, it presents a set of categorization parameters for 
describing a TET’s properties and functionality on the one hand, and a categorization of TETs 
based upon these parameters on the other hand. 
The next section provides an overview on existing approaches towards categorization and 
classification of TETs. Section 3 presents the TET categorization “TetCat” and its underlying 
categorization parameters. The section further illustrates the development process of the 
TetCat and elaborates on both the underlying categorization parameters and the identified 
TET categories. Section 4 critically discusses the TetCat and compares it to the existing 
approaches introduced in Section 2 to illustrate this paper’s contribution to the state of the art. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
2. Existing Approaches 
 
Only few work towards categorization of TETs has been conducted in this young research 
area. Four publications that provide categorization or classification approaches for TETs can 
be identified: (Hedbom, 2009), (Hildebrandt, 2009), (Janic et al., 2013) and (Zimmermann et 
al., 2014).  In the following a brief overview over these existing approaches is provided. A 
more detailed illustration of the existing approaches is provided in the next section. Section 4 
critically discusses the TetCat and compares it to the existing approaches.  
In the context of “Ambient Intelligence” or the “Internet of Things”, Hildebrandt 
distinguishes two types of TETs: 
 
• Type A: “legal and technological instruments that provide (a right of) access to data 
processing, implying a transfer of knowledge from data controller to data subject, and / 
or” 
• Type B: “legal and technological instruments that (provide a right to) counter-profile the 
smart environment to 'guess' how one's data match relevant group profiles that may affect 
one's risk and opportunities, implying that the observable and machine readable behaviour 
of one's environment provides enough information to anticipate the implications of one's 
behavior.” (Hildebrandt, 2009) 
 
Hildebrandt’s categorization of TETs has the advantage of including not only technological 
instruments but also legal approaches towards transparency. However, this categorization 
does not provide further insight into technical functionality of a TET and properties such as a 
TET’s trustworthiness. Hence, it is too coarse-grained to be suited for the contexts of 
development and assessment of technological TETs.  
Hedbom’s approach to categorizing TETs focuses more on the technological aspects of TETs 
(Hedbom, 2009). For classifying TETs, Hedbom proposes the classification parameters 
depicted in Table 1. While Hedbom’s classification approach is more comprehensive and 
fine-grained than Hildebrandt’s approach it suffers from several shortcomings. On the one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  https://myaccount.google.com/intro 
2	  https://wiki.mozilla.org/Privacy_Icons	  
hand, the classification parameter “Other Aspects” and its sub-parameters “Technologies 
Used” and “Security Requirements” are not clearly defined. Instead of allowing for precise 
classification of TETs they rather allow for a broad description of TETs. While this 
undoubtedly has its merits, it does not allow for easy comparison or categorization of TETs.  
Further, while Hedbom includes a trust-related classification parameter into its classification 
approach, he does not consider untrusted TETs. This seems rational, as untrusted TETs can 
hardly constitute valuable tools for supporting data-subjects in protecting their privacy. 
However, many tools, e.g. Google’s My Account, exist that fall under Hansen’s definition of 
TETs (Hansen, 2008), which is also used by Hedbom, but fit in none of Hedbom’s 
manifestations of his “Trust Requirements” classification parameter. However, the parameter 
can be used to determine which trust requirements a TET would have to fulfill “to be 
considered as a transparency tool” (Hedbom, 2009, p.77). Hedbom’s approach further does 
not distinguish between different sources of threats to privacy that a TET addresses. For 
example, My Account provides information on a data-controller’s data collection and 
inferences, while the “Personal Information Dashboard” by Buchmann et al. also aims at 
transparency with regard to data disclosure to other users of a social network service 
(Buchmann et al., 2013).  
 
Table 1 Hedbom's Classification Parameters (Hedbom, 2009) 
Classification Paramter Possible Manifestations 
Possibilities of Control and Verification 
Promises 
Read-Only 
Interactive 
Target Audiences Tools for Data Subjects Tools for Auditors / Proxies 
Scope 
Service Scope 
Organizational Scope 
Conglomerate Scope 
Trust Requirements 
Trusted Server 
Trusted Third Party 
Trusted Client 
No Trust Needed 
Information Presented 
Required Information 
Extended Information 
Third Party Information 
Other Aspect 
Technologies Used n.a. 
Security Requirements 
Sensitivity of data 
Concentration of data 
Ease of access 
 
 
An overview over a selection of current TETs is presented by Janic et al., along with a high-
level categorization of TETs (Janic et al., 2013). The presented TET categories are defined 
based on the transparency functionality they provide. Janic et al. identify the following five 
categories of transparency functionality: 
 
• Transparency as insight in intended data collection, storage, processing and/or disclosure 
• Transparency as insight in collected and/or stored data 
• Transparency as insight in third party tracking (insight in user behaviour data disclosure) 
• Transparency as insight in data collection, storage, processing and/or disclosure based on 
website’s reputation 
• Transparency as insight into (possibly) unwanted user’s data disclosure (awareness 
promoting) 
 
While this categorization provides some information on TETs, it does, e.g., not provide 
insight into the types of data regarding which a TET provides transparency. Further, it does 
not provide information regarding the trustworthiness of the information provided to data-
subjects via a TET. Generally, Janic et al.’s categorization does provide information regarding 
what type of transparency a TET provides, but no details on how this transparency is provided 
with respect to technology. 
Zimmermann et al. provide a specialized classification scheme for privacy dashboards, a 
specific class of TET (Zimmermann et al., 2014). Its classification parameters and their 
possible manifestations are depicted in Table 2. 
 
Table 1 Zimmermann et al.’s classification parameters (Zimmermann et al., 2014) 
Classification Parameter Manifestation 
Authentication Level 
Anonymous 
Pseudonymous 
Fully Identified 
Data Types 
Volunteered Data 
Incidental Data 
Observed Data 
Derived Data 
Interactivity Level 
Read-Only 
Interactive 
Collection 
Modification 
Deletion 
Usage 
Reach One-to-One One-to-Many 
Execution Environment 
Client 
Server 
Hybrid 
TTP 
Delivery Mode 
Push 
Pull 
Push & Pull 
 
The classification scheme allows for a relatively precise classification and description of 
privacy dashboards but it also suffers from several drawbacks. First, the approach is tailored 
specifically to privacy dashboards that provide information “… over data a data controller has 
accumulated about [data subjects]” (Zimmermann et al., 2014, p. 153). Hence, it is too 
specific for the purpose of categorization and classification of TETs in general.  Second, 
similar to the above-presented approaches, it does not consider a TET’s trustworthiness and 
different sources of privacy threats addressable by TETs.  
As described above, the approaches by Hedbom, Hildebrandt, Zimmermann et al. and Janic et 
al. are not comprehensive and detailed enough to allow for detailed classification and 
assessment of TETs from a technical perspective. Hence, in the next section, a more 
comprehensive and detailed classification and categorization approach for TET is proposed.  
3. Categorizing Transparency-Enhancing Technologies 
 
In the following, categorization parameters for precisely describing a TET are provided. 
These categorization parameters serve two purposes: First, they provide a means to describe a 
TET's properties and functionalities and, second, they constitute a means to define distinct 
categories of TETs into which a specific TET can be classified. These categories are 
presented in Section 3.2. 
 
3.1. Categorization Parameters 
 
Figure 1 presents the categorization parameters building the foundation of the presented TET 
categorization TetCat. Further, Figure1 illustrates the development process of the TetCat’s 
categorization parameters. As depicted, the parameters were constructed by synthesizing and 
extending the categorization approaches by Hedbom and Zimmermann et al. (Hedbom, 2009; 
Zimmermann et al., 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1 The TetCat’s categorization parameters and their origins 
 
In Figure 1, solid arrows indicate synthesis, adoption and/or extension of existing parameters 
and dashed arrows indicate implicit consideration. Hedbom’s “Other Apects” have not been 
Hedbom, 2009 TetCat Zimmermann et al., 2014
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taken into account in the development of the TetCat, as they are not aimed at classification 
but constitute “rather a list of possible capabilities” respectively “list [of ] some aspects” 
(Hedbom, 2009, p. 74). In the following, the TetCat’s categorization parameters are presented 
and the development process of the TetCat is illustrated. Figure 2 depicts the TetCat’s 
categorization parameters and their possible manifestations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The TetCat’s categorization parameters and their possible manifestation 
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Application Time (AT) 
 
The “Application Time” parameter describes the point of time at which a TET provides data-
subjects with transparency, relative to the time of data collection resp. processing. This 
parameter implicitly draws from Hedbom’s “Possibility of Control and Verification” 
(Hedbom, 2009). 
TETs can be applied before, during or after data collection and processing. TETs that are 
applied ex ante data collection and processing provide information regarding a data-
controller’s reputation or her intended data collection and processing, e.g., by presenting to 
data-subjects easily understandable representations of the data-controller’s privacy policy.  
Hence, Ex Ante TETs are related to Janic et al.’s TETs that provide transparency “as insight in 
intended data collection, storage, processing and/or disclosure” and Hedbom’s Promises 
TETs.  Examples of TETs that aim at providing transparency ex ante data collection and 
processing are early versions of the DataTrack (Hansen, 2008) or the Mozilla Privacy Icons 
(see above). 
TETs can also provide transparency during data collection and processing, e.g., by providing 
data-subjects with a real-time visualization of companies that follow them on the Internet via 
cookies. An example for a TET that is applied during data collection and processing is 
“LightBeam”3. 
While data collection and processing usually occur continuously, atomic steps in the process 
of data collection and processing can be identified, e.g., the collection of a specific data item 
at a specific point in time or the point of time at which a specific data item is derived from 
already collected data. Hence, TETs can provide insight into data collection and processing 
retrospectively, e.g., by providing data-subjects with insight into data about them stored by a 
data-controller. Examples of TETs that provide transparency ex post data collection and 
processing are current versions of the DataTrack (Fischer-Hübner et al., 2011), My Account 
or Acxiom's “AboutTheData” portal4. 
Target Audience (TA) 
 
Following Hedbom, the TetCat distinguishes between TETs that directly address data-
subjects and TETs that address external auditors (Hedbom, 2009). 
Interactivity Level (IL) 
 
The “Interactivity Level” parameter describes, from a technological perspective, the level of 
control that a data-subject can exercise via a TET. While Read-Only TETs provide data-
subjects solely with insight into a data-controller’s data collection and processing, Interactive 
TETs allow data-subjects to exercise control over collection and processing through 
negotiation of privacy policies, through exercising control over usage or through allowing 
deletion or modification of information from existing profiles (Hedbom, 2009; Zimmermann 
et al., 2014). An example of a Read-Only TET is “Privacy Bird”5, while My Account is an 
example of an Interactive TET.   
The IL parameter is adopted from (Zimmermann et al., 2014). Hedbom’s “Possibilities of 
Control and Verification” also resembles this parameter. However, “Interactivity Level” does 
not include Hedbom’s Promises manifestation. Promises TETs provide information on data-
controllers’ intended or purported behavior but “give no on line [sic!] or automatic way for 
the user/proxy to verify these claims” (Hedbom, 2009, p. 70). Hence, Promises TETs do not 
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provide data-subjects with technological means to exercise control. Thus, in this paper, 
Promises TETs are considered Read-Only TETs and the information on whether a TET 
provides insight into actual or intended behavior is considered in the parameters “Assurance 
Level” and “Application Time”. 
Delivery Mode (DM) 
 
Following Zimmermann et al.’s approach, the “Delivery Mode” parameter describes how a 
TET notifies data-subjects of aspects relevant to their privacy. Transparency-Enhancing 
Technologies can either actively notify data-subjects (push) of events relevant to their privacy 
or require data-subjects to actively inform themselves (pull) (Zimmermann et al., 2014).  For 
example, Ghostery6 actively warns data-subjects of trackers (push) while current privacy 
dashboards, e.g., the  AboutTheData portal, require data-subjects to actively visit the portal 
website to gain insight (pull). 
Authentication Level (AL) 
 
As the DM parameter, the parameter “Authentication Level” is adopted directly from 
(Zimmermann et al., 2014). Transparency-Enhancing Technologies can be used 
anonymously, pseudonymously or fully identified (Zimmermann et al., 2014). For example, 
tools such as Ghostery that solely visualize trackers that are sent by a website do not require 
data-subjects to authenticate themselves. Privacy dashboards provided by data-controllers or 
(Trusted) Third Parties ((T)TPs), however, require data-subjects to authenticate themselves in 
order to match data-subjects to their profiles (Zimmermann et al., 2014). While, e.g., My 
Account can be used pseudonymously, the AboutTheData portal requires data-subjects to 
fully identify themselves through their social security number. 
Execution Environment (EE) 
 
As the previous two parameters, the “Execution Environment” parameter is adopted straight 
forward from (Zimmermann et al., 2014). 
This categorization parameter describes on which party's systems a TET is operated 
(Zimmermann et al., 2014). Client-side TETs are operated by data-subjects on their own 
systems, e.g., as a browser plug-in such as LightBeam. Server-side TET are operated by data-
controllers which provide them to data-subjects, e.g., via a website such as Google's My 
Account.   
TETs that are (T)TP-based are provided by (trusted) third parties to provide data-subjects 
with transparency with regard to specific data-controllers’ data handling practices. If one 
considers the website's provider trustworthy, the “Me & My Shadow” website7 can be 
considered a TTP-based TET. It provides data-subjects with information regarding which data 
they disclose when using specific web services, operating systems or other applications. Other 
examples of (T)TP-based TETs are government-supported privacy seals such as the 
“European Privacy Seal”8.  
Hybrid TETs combine traits of the aforementioned tools, i.e., they comprise different modules 
that are operated by different parties. Current versions of the DataTrack constitute hybrid 
TETs, as the underlying middleware is executed on the systems of data-subjects as well as on 
those of data-controllers (Fischer-Hübner et al., 2011). 
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Scope (SP) 
 
The “Scope” parameter synthesizes Zimmermann et al.’s “Reach” parameter and Hedbom’s  
“Scope” parameter (Hedbom, 2009; Zimmermann et al., 2014). It describes the range of 
services respectively data-controllers that a TET considers in providing transparency. 
Transparency-Enhancing Technologies can aim at providing transparency with regard to a 
service, to an organization or to several organizations. A TET that exhibits a Service scope is, 
e.g., the transparency functionality of the Amazon Book Recommendation System, which 
provides Amazon’s customers with information regarding the data Amazon has stored about 
them and how that data is being used for recommendations.  A TET that provides 
transparency with respect to an organization is, e.g., the AboutTheData portal. An example 
for a TET with Scope Multi-Organization is the Personal Information Dashboard (Buchmann 
et al., 2013) that aims at providing data-subjects with transparency with regard to several 
Social Network Services (SNS). 
Data Types Presented (DT) 
 
The “Data Types Presented” parameter is an enhancement of the “Data Types” parameter by 
Zimmermann et al. (Zimmermann et al., 2014). In contrast to the implicitly related 
“Information Presented” parameter from (Hedbom, 2009), it takes a technological perspective 
to describe regarding which types of data a TET provides insight.   
The parameter’s manifestations are based on (Schneier, 2010) and (World Economic Forum, 
2012). In this work, as in (Zimmermann et al., 2014), Volunteered Data is defined as “data a 
user actively and knowingly discloses”, Observed Data as “data a user passively discloses, 
i.e., data that results from the interaction of a user with a provider”, Incidental Data as “data 
about a user that is disclosed not by the user herself but by others” and Derived Data as “data 
about users that is inferred as result of data analysis” (Zimmermann et al., 2014, p. 153). In 
contrast to Zimmermann et al.’s “Data Types” parameter, “Data Types Presented” further 
features the manifestation Policy to take into account TETs that do not provide insight into 
data already stored by a data-controller but also TETs that provide insight into a data-
controller’s privacy policy. 
Information Source (IS) and Transparency Dimension (TD) 
 
Both the “Information Source” and the “Transparency Dimensions” parameters are implicitly 
connected to Hedbom’s “Information Presented” parameter (Hedbom, 2009). The 
“Information Presented” parameter distinguishes between Required information, Extended 
information and Third party information (Hedbom, 2009, p. 73). The former two 
manifestations of Hedbom’s parameter consider the information that a TET presents from a 
legal perspective. While Required information is information that a “service provider has to 
provide according to the Law [sic!]” (Hedbom, 2009, p.73), Extended information is 
information “that is not legally required” (Hedbom, 2009, p.73). In contrast to that 
perspective, the latter manifestation (Third party information) refers to the source of 
information from a technological perspective. It is used by Hedbom to describe TETs that 
“[gather] and [present] information given or harvested from other sources than the service 
provider” (Hedbom, 2009, p.73).  
The TetCat avoids this mixing of different perspectives within one categorization parameter 
by building upon three categorization parameters to describe information source on the one 
hand and information extent on the other hand. While the parameter “Data Types Presented” 
(see above) describes information extent from a technological perspective, the parameter 
“Transparency Dimension” describes information extent with regard to the different stages of 
the data utilization cycle. First, TET can provide data-subjects with insight into data 
collection, i.e., insight into which data is collected by whom (Collection). Second, they can 
also provide data-subjects with insight into the analysis of the data collected by data-
controllers, e.g., by providing data-subjects with information on inference antecedents 
(Analysis). Third, TETs can provide data-subjects with insight into how and for what 
purposes data about them is being used by a data-controller (Usage). Finally, TETs can 
provide data-subjects with insight into second usage of data, e.g., information on how third 
parties use data about them and the purposes and conditions of the data transfer from the 
original data-controller to these parties (2nd Usage). 
The information provided by a TET can stem from different source.  The “Information 
Source” parameter considers two potential sources of information that a TET can draw from 
to provide information. Data-Controllers themselves can provide data-subjects with 
information relating to a data-subject’s privacy and her personal data via a TET (Data-
Controller). A TET can, however, also provide information by drawing from other, trusted or 
untrusted, sources ((T)TP), such as government audit of privacy practices, privacy seals or 
(crowd-sourced) reputation services (Hedbom, 2009; Janic et al., 2013). The “Information 
Source” parameter also takes into account Janic et al.’s insight that TET can provide 
information stemming from sources other than the data-controller herself. They partly take 
this into account in their category of TETs that provide “transparency as insight in data 
collection, storage, processing and/or disclosure based on website’s reputation” (Janic et al., 
2013, p. 22). 
Assurance Level (AS) 
 
This categorization parameter implicitly is related to Hedbom's “Possibilities of Control and 
Verification” and “Trust Requirements” parameters (Hedbom, 2009) (see above). It is used to 
describe the extent to which data-subjects can determine the completeness and correctness of 
the information that a TET provides them with. The correctness and completeness of the 
information provided by Untrusted TETs can not be determined by the data-subjects and no 
auditing entity that acts on the data-subject’s behalf exists. Trusted TETs provide information, 
whose correctness and completeness are guaranteed by technical means. The correctness and 
completeness of the information provided by Semi-trusted TETs can not be guaranteed by 
technical means but a data-subject or an auditor can manually determine whether the 
information is correct and complete. 
Attacker Model (AM) 
 
In providing transparency, TETs can focus on different sources of threats to data-subjects’ 
privacy. TETs can focus on transparency within a specific service with respect to other users 
of the service, e.g., by providing insight into which other users of a SNS can see a data-
subject’s posts (Service User). Further, TETs can also focus on specific service providers a 
data-subject interacts with and provide the data-subject with, e.g., insight into stored profile 
data and its usage (Service Provider). Finally, TETs can focus on insight into third parties' 
data handling, e.g., that of parties that a data-subject does not interact with directly or 
knowingly, e.g., a service provider's advertising partners or companies crawling publicly 
accessible data on the Internet (Third Party). 
3.2. Categories of Transparency-Enhancing Technologies 
 
The above described categorization parameters can be utilized to define TET categories that 
differ with regard to the manifestations of specific categorization parameters. The here 
presented categorization TetCat depicted in Figure 3 comprises six categories of TETs.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 TetCat: Categorization of Transparency-Enhancing Technologies 
 
For category definition the categorization parameters Assurance Level, Application Time and 
Interactivity Level are used as key determinants for distinction. The parameter Assurance 
Level is used as the primary determinant for defining TET categories, while Application Time 
and Interactivity Level constitute secondary, respectively tertiary, determinants. Assurance 
Level is used as primary determinant because a TET’s suitability to support privacy 
protection heavily depends on its trustworthiness. Application Time has been chosen as 
secondary determinant to be able to clearly distinguish TETs that aim at enabling data-
subjects to make informed decisions regarding whether to use or not to use a specific service 
and TETs that aim at enabling data-subject to gain insight into, and possibly exercise control 
over, already disclosed data. Finally, Interactivity Level has been chosen as tertiary 
determinant to be able to distinguish between TETs that only provide insight and TETs that 
empower data-subjects to exercise control over data relating to them. In the following, the 
categories are presented. A critical analysis of the TetCat is provided in Section 4.  
Assertion TETs 
 
The TET category “Assertion TET” is defined by exhibiting Assurance Level Untrusted, i.e., 
Assertion TETs provide no means to determine the correctness and completeness of the 
information they provide. The TetCat does not further distinguish between Untrusted TETs 
based on other parameters. It refrains from doing so, as an Untrusted TET's unsuitability to 
provide trustworthy transparency remains unaffected by its manifestations of other 
parameters. Assertion TETs can only provide data-subjects with information regarding a data-
controller's purported data handling practices.  
Awareness TETs and Declaration TETs 
 
The categories “Awareness TET” and “Declaration TET” exhibit Assurance Level Semi-
Trusted or Trusted and Application Time Ex Ante. However, while Awareness TETs exhibit 
Interactivity Level Read-Only, Declaration TETs are interactive. 
Assertion TET 
Awareness TET Declaration TET 
AS: Untrusted AS: (Semi-)Trusted 
IL: Read Only IL: Interactive 
AT: Ex Ante AT: Ex Post / Realtime 
TET 
Audit TET 
IL: Read Only IL: Interactive 
Intervention 
TET 
Remediation 
TET 
Collection / Usage 
Collection / Usage & 
Modification / Deletion 
As TETs of both categories are applied ex ante data collection and processing, they do not 
aim at providing transparency with regard to already existing profiles but with respect to data-
controllers’ intended data handling practices or their privacy policies or reputation.  
The Assurance Level of Awareness TETs refers to data-subjects’ (respectively auditors) 
capability to determine the correctness and completeness of the information provided about 
the privacy policy or the data-controllers’ compliance with specific privacy requirements such 
as defined by entities that issue privacy seals. The same holds for Declaration TETs. 
However, they also provide data-subjects with functionality for policy negotiation.   
Audit TETs, Intervention TETs and Remediation TETs 
 
Exhibiting Application Time Ex Post, the categories “Audit TET”, “Intervention TET” and 
“Remediation TET” comprise TETs with Assurance Level (Semi-)Trusted that are able to 
provide data-subjects with insight into data actually stored by data controllers and into how 
the data is used by them. While Audit TETs exhibit Interactivity Level Read-Only and, hence, 
provide data-subjects only with insight into stored data and, possibly, its usage, Intervention 
TETs and Remediation TETs also provide data-subjects with functionality to exercise control 
over data stored on the data-controller side. Intervention TETs exhibit Interactivity Level 
Interactive and provide functionality to exercise control over further collection and/or usage 
of data. Remediation TETs also provide functionality to exercise control over further 
collection and/or usage of data but also comprise functionality for modification and/or 
deletion of data relating to a data-subject already stored by a data-controller.  
4. Discussion 
 
In order to discuss the TetCat and critically compare it to existing classification and 
categorization approaches, in the following it is applied to TETs that have already been 
classified in (Hedbom, 2009; Janic et al., 2013; Zimmermann et al., 2014).  In particular, the 
TETs Privacy Bird, MyAccount, Lightbeam  (formerly named “Collusion”) and the Amazon 
Book Recommendation System are classified in the following.  
Tables 4a and 4b depict the analysis results. In the tables, green fields indicate that the 
respective classification is taken directly from the respective authors while white fields 
indicate that the respective classification was performed by the author of this paper based on 
the respective categorization approaches. The My Account constitutes a special case. The My 
Account TET is an amalgamation of the TETs “Google Privacy Dashboard” and “Google 
APM”, which were analyzed in (Janic et al., 2013) and (Zimmermann et al., 2014), 
respectively. While, the original classification by Janic et al. remains unaffected by the 
amalgamation, the respective fields in Table 4a are still colored white to indicate the 
reapplication of their approach. Due to the amalgamation, Zimmermann et al.’s original 
classification of the Google APM can not be compared to a classification of the My Account. 
Thus, their approach has also been reapplied to the MyAccount. As can be seen in Tables 4a 
and 4b, the categorization approach by Janic et al. allows for far less fine-grained description 
and categorization of TETs than the other approaches. Hence, their approach is not further 
considered in this discussion.  
The approach by Zimmermann et al. focuses specifically on privacy dashboards and, hence, is 
not applicable to TET that do not provide information “… over data a data controller has 
accumulated about [data subjects]” (Zimmermann et al., 2014, p. 153). Consequently, the 
TetCat is better suited to allow for classification of TETs in general. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4a Comparison of the TetCat with existing approaches 
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Figure 4b Comparison of the TetCat with existing approaches 
 
The categorization approach by Hedbom does not provide categories of TETs but only 
classification parameters, which are suited to describe TETs to a limited extent. However, 
besides providing distinct categories of TETs, the TetCat allows for a more fine-grained and 
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precise description of TETs because of its more fine-grained and detailed categorization 
parameters. For example, as can be seen in the classifications of the Amazon 
Recommendation System or the My Account TET, the TetCat allows for a more precise 
description of data-subjects’ capability to interact with the system. As can be seen in the 
classification of the Privacy Bird, the TetCat is also better suited to describe the technological 
infrastructure of a TET (Execution Environment) and the provenance of the data presented by 
a TET (Information Source). 
While the TetCat provides a more fine-grained categorization and allows for a more precise 
classification than current approaches towards classifying and categorizing TETs, it still 
exhibits some limitations. Obviously, the categorization depicted in Figure 3 is not completely 
final. More categories can be defined to allow for a more detailed categorization. For 
example, a TET can provide transparency before data collection and processing while at the 
same time also providing insight after collection and analysis. Further, a TET can also exhibit 
Assurance Level Untrusted with respect to some of the information it provides while at the 
same time providing other information whose correctness and completeness can be 
determined by a data-subject or auditor or is guaranteed by technical means. This is the case 
with the Amazon Book Recommendation System, which, as depicted in Table 4b, could be 
classified as both an Assertion TET and a Remediation TET. 
However, this paper aims at providing an easily understandable and usable classification and 
categorization approach to lay the ground for a common terminology to facilitate 
requirements analysis, development and assessment of TETs. Hence, in order to preserve 
readability and usability, while at the same time providing a more comprehensive and detailed 
classification and categorization approach than currently available, no further categories are 
included into the TetCat. 
Another limitation refers to the categorization parameter Interactivity Level. It refers to a 
TET's capability to enable data-subjects to exercise control over data stored on the side of a 
data-controller or to negotiate policies. However, as is the case with the Personal Information 
Dashboard (Buchmann et al., 2013), TET can also provide a limited extent of interactivity 
without enabling data-subjects to exercise control over a data-controller's data storage and 
handling. For example, the Personal Information Dashboard provides data-subjects with 
functionality to delete other users' posts from her Facebook wall. However, this does not 
necessarily delete the posts' content and the resulting inferences from Facebook's internal 
storage. This type of interactivity is not taken into account within the presented approach. 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper aimed at facilitating requirements analysis for and development and assessment of 
Transparency-Enhancing Technologies. It presented a classification approach for 
Transparency-Enhancing Technologies and a categorization of these instruments in order to 
provide the basis for a common terminology. The presented approach builds upon previous 
work by Hedbom and on joint work by the author of this paper and colleagues (Hedbom, 
2009; Zimmermann et al., 2014).  
The applicability of the presented approach and its contribution to the state of the art have 
been demonstrated in a critical comparison with existing approaches. 
Although it exhibits some limitations, the presented classification approach and categorization 
provide a means to categorize and describe Transparency-Enhancing Technologies in a more 
comprehensive and detailed manner than previous approaches.  
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